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By focusing so exclusively on rules and standards of operations, the intelligence debate of the mid-1970s did not answer the fundamental question of what the United States expects of its intelligence services or what they are to accomplish in order to meet the challenges of the 1980s.

The Substance and the Rules

Since the early 1970s, this country's intelligence agencies have been asking, "What does the country expect of us?" That question had not arisen in the postwar period because the American political system had left the agencies to the total discretion of those appointed to lead them. In the early 1970s, factional conflict among those leaders spilled over into a national debate about what America's practitioners of intelligence ought to have foremost in mind. That debate continues.

Recently, Admiral Stansfield Turner, President Carter's Director of Central Intelligence, and his former special assistant, George Thibault, published an attempt both to answer that question and to indict the Reagan administration's handling of intelligence. The author's answer seems to be that

the American people expect their intelligence agencies to be as innocuous as possible. They charge that the Reagan administration is undermining the agencies by loosening too many restrictions. The authors thus contend that for our civil liberties' sake, and for the sake of the agencies' own standing in the country, the agencies ought to concentrate on formulating for themselves the right kinds of rules and restrictions. However, one would not suspect from Turner and Thibault's article, that the rules by which intelligence officers live ought to flow from the intelligence profession's substantive requirements.

Nevertheless, in intelligence as in other areas of government, the American people rightly want their employees to accomplish the functions for which they are paid. This author will argue that Stansfield Turner is

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Crisis Mangling and the Cuban Brigade

Gloria Duffy

Gloria Duffy is Executive Director of Ploughshares Foundation. In addition to the references cited, this article is based on the Carter Administration.

The furor over a supposed brigade of Soviet combat troops, discovered in the fall of 1979 to be stationed in Cuba, should have been no more than a minor controversy within the U.S. intelligence community. Instead, an intense diplomatic storm ensued between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Revelation of the particular data on Soviet troops in Cuba which surfaced in 1979 would have stirred little public concern at any other time, but the information came to light in the volatile political environment of the Carter Administration's third year in office, as the Administration's management of relations with the Soviet Union came under mounting attack. In this atmosphere, a minor and inconclusive piece of intelligence became a political issue. The crisis which grew from public disclosure of the brigade discovery had disproportionate effects on the debate over ratification of the SALT II treaty, the course of U.S.-Soviet relations, and Soviet perceptions of American will and leadership. As Cyrus Vance recently said of the crisis:

"... I think it clearly hurt the ratification process, without any doubt. There was an erosion of the support for SALT prior to the Cuban brigade issue, but clearly it was a real blow that set us back substantially."¹

Most contemporary historians date the present chill in U.S.-Soviet relations from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. But in many ways, the brigade affair four months earlier was the turning point towards a higher level of hostility between the superpowers.

Those aware of the brigade crisis universally regard the incident as a low point in Carter Administration foreign policy, and perhaps even in the history of U.S.-Soviet relations. Ray Cline, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the Kennedy years, dubbed the incident at the time an exercise in "crisis mangling," rather than crisis management. And the International Institute for Strategic Studies even more contemptuously demoted the episode to a "storm in a teacup" in its annual review of politico-military events. Beyond the impression that a sequence of events took place which was confusing and perhaps badly managed by the United States, however, no one is quite certain exactly what came to pass and why. Earlier incidents involving the issue of Soviet forces in Cuba—the 1962 missile crisis, the 1969–70 controversy over Soviet naval facilities at Cienfuegos, and even a minor debate in 1978 about Soviet MiG-23 aircraft on the island—have been studied and mined for their significance. But the brigade incident remains a question mark for many of the individuals who made American foreign policy at the time, not to mention for the public. What really happened? Was there a combat brigade in Cuba? Why did the United States negotiate at length with the Soviets on the issue? What did the Carter Administration ask the Soviets to do about the brigade, and how did the Russians respond? What were the effects of the event, and what lessons are to be learned?

A closer look at the incident reveals some aspects contrary to the conventional wisdom. Even those most informed about the brigade affair vilify former Idaho Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1979, as the main American alarmist about the brigade,

1. Interview with Robert Scheer in Scheer's *With Enough Shovels* (New York: Random House, 1982), p. 226.

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
Keeping the Company's Secrets

The censors turn on a former CIA director

As CIA director under Jimmy Carter, Admiral Stansfield Turner established the Publications Review Board, in essence a censorship committee within the agency to ensure that no secrets crept into print in the writings of former agents. It was Turner who was responsible for the civil prosecution of Frank W. Snepp, whose 1977 book, *Decent Interval*, a critical study of the agency's role in Viet Nam, was published without prior CIA review, in violation of his contract with the agency. In February 1980, the Supreme Court ordered Snepp to hand over profits from his book to the Government. So far, that ruling has cost Snepp nearly \$200,000 in forgone royalties.

Now, ironically, Turner is running afoul of the review process he helped create. Agency censors want to delete material from Turner's own book about intelligence gathering operations. They claim that Turner's disclosures would endanger CIA sources and methods.

Turner, who has been highly critical of the CIA under Ronald Reagan, has rewritten the offending chapters, but he is digging in his heels to retain some anecdotes about CIA clandestine operations that he insists do not compromise U.S. se-



Stansfield Turner

curity interests. The nature of the proposed deletions, he was quoted as saying, "changes the chapters and makes them less appealing from a sales point of view." He explains, "I believe it's in the interest of an open society to make public as much information as you can, without endangering national security."

That argument carries little weight in the Reagan Administration, which is appalled by too many leaks and has tightened rules on classification, making it easier for Government papers to be stamped SECRET. Last March the President issued a directive extending security procedures to all those in Government who are cleared for highly classified information. They now must sign prepublication review agreements covering their writings even after they have retired. Previously such strictures applied only to members of the intelligence Establishment like Snepp and Turner.

Turner says he is confident that the dispute can be settled without litigation, but if the CIA stands fast that will be his only course of action short of defying the agency as Snepp did. "If we did end up in court, it would surprise me," he says. "This is a highly negotiated process." ■

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The CIA Turns Tables On Its Former Master

Retired Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the Central Intelligence Agency during the Carter administration, is getting a dose of his own directives. Turner is writing a book. The book involves, not surprisingly, the CIA. In it, Turner illustrated "the principles of conducting intelligence" with anecdotes from his experience in running the agency. No problem, right? Wrong. The CIA's publication-review board has determined that many of Turner's insider anecdotes are too sensitive for public consumption and bounced the book back to Turner for revision. Specifically, CIA censors have found problems in three of the chapters, claiming they include classified information that, if published, would reveal sources and methods of agency operation. Turner insists that there were "serious problems" with only one chapter, and that it has already been rewritten.

Ironically, Turner himself set up the CIA publication-review board in 1977. The board drew controversy when Turner prosecuted former CIA agent Frank Snepp for failing to submit his book on the fall of Vietnam, "Decent Interval," for clearance. In 1980 the Supreme Court ordered Snepp to pay \$140,000 in earnings from his book to the government. Turner today denies any similarities between his and the Snepp case.

"The difference is he's a scoundrel who broke a legal contract," says Turner. "I'm fulfilling my contract dutifully." Still, Snepp cannot help but relish Turner's literary disputes with the agency. "I want to emphasize that nobody can rejoice at the spectacle of a fellow citizen getting bludgeoned by CIA censors," says Snepp. "CIA censorship is arbitrary, unreasonable and adaptable to any political view. But I do feel entitled to a kind of 'I told you so' attitude."

Turner: Rewrite

Bruce Hoertel



The Censors And The Censored

The irony is so thick you could scarcely penetrate it with a piercing metaphor. The nation's former spymaster, Adm. Stansfield Turner — the man who, as director of the CIA under Jimmy Carter, enforced an outrageous agency gag rule — is himself being gagged by those who now run the shop. The CIA's censorship committee, the innocuously named Publications Review Board, has taken exception to several parts of a book Turner is writing on the craft of intelligence.

What makes Turner's case so ironic is that it was under his tenure that the CIA won a major Supreme Court decision denying Frank Snepp, a former agency operative, the earnings from a book he wrote because he didn't clear it with his former employers. The pre-publication review rule that snared Snepp has since been expanded by the Reagan administration to effectively gag any official with access to classified material — not just CIA personnel — from ever publishing anything that bears even indirectly on his or her government service, without first submitting it to the censors. More than that, the administration wants to make it a crime, not merely a civil offense, to publish uncensored material.

Turner has complained that the deletions made by the agency have no basis, since the material is not classified and poses no threat

to anyone. An aide to the admiral put it more bluntly: The cuts are nit-picking and quibbling, he says. Right or wrong, that complaint touches on a basic flaw in the government policy: It gives arbitrary power to the censors who, for whatever reason, can gut a book not necessarily because it reveals strategic secrets but because it may cast some political or administration figure in an unfavorable light. Or, the censors simply may not like the author.

Turner insists the matter will be resolved by negotiation, but hasn't ruled out litigation. In fact, to compound the irony, the attorney he has retained, Anthony Lapham, was the CIA's chief counsel when it went to court against Frank Snepp. Suing could, of course, cost the admiral a lot, something Snepp would know about. Asked for his reaction to Turner's plight, Snepp couldn't help seeing "poetic justice in the fact that the architect of the CIA's censorship should now be feeling the heat."

Beyond that, though, there's also the lingering injustice of a regulation — so far upheld in rubber-stamp fashion by federal courts — that has the potential to censor far more than classified information and to intimidate countless persons who, hesitating to tangle with the intelligence elite, will keep quiet when speaking out could be in the public interest.

The censor is censored

Ex-CIA chief runs afoul of own policy

The tables have turned on Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of Central Intelligence during the Carter administration.

Three years ago, he diligently reinforced the agency's authority to censor the writings of former employees. Now, to the admiral's annoyance, the censor is chopping away at his book, which he believes makes a useful contribution to the debate about the role of spy agencies in a democratic society.

The admiral's recollections should be made available to the public, preferably intact. Because ill-advised intelligence operations have hurt the nation, the issue of CIA accountability is of great interest and importance. Few people are better qualified than Adm. Turner to write about it.

Like all CIA employees, however, the admiral signed a pledge that he would allow the agency to "review" any books or articles about his experiences. He submitted the manuscript as required. No one claims he disclosed secrets, but the censor found objectionable passages. Adm. Turner frets that the deletions would take the zing out of several chapters.

He would have less to complain about, however, if he had tried to change the system when he was in charge. Instead, he marshaled the agency's legal forces against Frank Snepp, an ex-agent who wrote an unflattering account of the CIA's behavior during the final days of the Vietnam war.

Mr. Snepp was not accused of reveal-

ing classified information. But he did fail to get his book cleared before publication. The Supreme Court eventually decided that he had violated a position of trust and that his profits must go to the government.

The Snepp case should have alerted Adm. Turner to the serious defects in the CIA's censorship policy. The ruling left the CIA in a very strong position to inhibit retired or former agents from publishing material that is even remotely critical of intelligence activities.

This result is contrary to the public interest. So long as the censor's rulings are not subject to review or appeal, citizens can be kept in the dark about their government's activities for the most trivial reasons. In the case of Adm. Turner, who has openly criticized administration policies, the harassment may have more to do with politics than national security. President Reagan now wants to extract similar secrecy vows from other federal officials.

If there has to be censorship, it must at least be administered by an objective board that protects real secrets, not official blunders. An author like Adm. Turner should have some avenue of appeal when an important message is vitiated by "nitpicking."

Such reforms have no appeal to the Reagan administration, but Mr. Turner's record was not very good, either. Potential readers of his book can only regret his role in buttressing the policy that now stymies him.

Times Editorial

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The Nation

Admiral T——r In Nasty Fix

One perk of high-level Government service has come to be a shot at making big bucks on a book. However, Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence in the Carter Ad-

ministration, is having trouble bringing his manuscript in from the cold. The New York Times disclosed last week, because of objections raised by C.I.A. censors. There was irony in the Admiral's dilemma; at his direction, the agency's blue-pencil artists and a flying squad of lawyers went after Frank Snepp, a former agent who had failed to clear his book about the fall of Saigon with the C.I.A.

Mr. Turner complained that substantial portions of his book — which, among other things, describes his term as spymaster — had been deleted for no apparent reason. The retired Navy admiral has hired a lawyer, Anthony Lapham, who should know his stuff; he was the agency's general counsel at the time of the Snepp proceedings.

Mr. Snepp, whom Mr. Turner accused of violating his security oath in 1977 by publishing "Decent Interval" without submitting it for review, wasn't sympathetic. "I think Turner deserves everything the censors visit on him because he failed to recognize just how dangerous censorship was in the first place," said Mr. Snepp, who was ultimately ordered by the Supreme Court to give the Government \$140,000 in royalties. Many other present and former officials may have similar troubles soon. Federal agencies and departments were recently set to drafting regulations to implement an administration directive that those who have had access to secrets must in many cases submit their written words for review.

THE ALLENTOWN CHRONICLE (

22 May 1983

Censoring the censors

There's a sweet mixture of irony and poetic justice when a former intelligence censor himself comes under the censor's scrutiny, and fails the test.

This has been happening to Stansfield Turner, the retired Navy admiral who headed the Central Intelligence Agency in the Carter administration.

It was Adm. Turner who was the paramount force behind the CIA's attempt to suppress "Decent Interval," a book by former CIA officer Frank Snepp III. It was published by Random House in 1977. But three years ago, after lengthy legal battles, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Snepp had to give up all his earnings from the book (then \$140,000) and turn them over to the United States government.

Now Adm. Turner is in a protracted battle with his former colleagues at the CIA over the text of his own book, which he describes as turning on issues "of running secret intelligence operations in a democratic society."

The admiral has complained that the agency's Publication Review Board so disliked parts of three chapters that it blue-penciled 10 percent of one section, thus emasculating it "from a sales point of view." The deleted passages contained anecdotes by the admiral from the time when he was director of the CIA. "They (CIA censors)," the admiral told a reporter for The New York Times, "feel that by describing the operations I would violate security."

In defense of the CIA censors (and of common sense), that does seem a reasonable conclusion to us. However much we dislike censors and censorship, few reasonable people would disagree that in intelligence work censorship goes with the territory. The real problem arises not from active agents but from former agents who want to take a busman's holiday and get paid for it. They all seem to have visions of becoming as rich as Croesus by telling all they can about their lives in the secret world.

The sad fact is that few "kiss-and-tell" books by former secret agents become best-sellers. The British, who have been at the spy business longer than Americans, discovered this a long time ago, and found a happy way around it. The smart former intelligence operatives wrote their hearts out when they left the service, and not one to our knowledge has ever been sued or jailed by his former employer, or had his royalties confiscated.

That's because three of the former agents we have in mind, W. Somerset Maugham, Graham Greene and David Cornwell (better known as John le Carre), turned fact into profit by peddling their "memoirs" of life in the secret world as fiction.

Fact might be stranger than fiction, but it doesn't sell nearly as well.

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Spy Stories and Vile Racism

What do the former Director of Central Intelligence and the operators of a country music station in Dodge City have in common? They both want the Government to stop censoring their work.

Stansfield Turner wants to finish a book about his tour of duty as America's top spy, complete with anecdotes about the travails of intelligence-gathering in a democracy. But the C.I.A. says he'd be telling secrets and wants to delete his best stories. They're negotiating and may end up in court.

Meanwhile in Kansas, Nellie and Charlie Babbs, unharpered by the prior restraint that binds the intelligence chief, want to continue broadcasting hate messages without having the Federal Communications Commission lift their license.

We don't know what Admiral Turner wants to say. Maybe he wants to show how the nature of democracy interferes with intelligence-gathering.

Or perhaps he wants to warn that intelligence-gathering threatens freedom. Either way, we'd like to read his book without editing by the C.I.A. It's

warming to find the Admiral, the person who used to be in charge of keeping secrets, now making our argument that nit-picking censors can drain a book of its message.

As for the Babbses, the problem is not that they say too little but too much. For instance, they denounce Jews as "children of Satan" and speak loosely about cleansing the land by roadblock and ambush. These vicious messages and violent hints are enough to test one's faith in a marketplace of uninhibited debate.

Still, that's what free speech is all about. The Babbses may be unfit station operators by F.C.C. standards because of their refusal to pay taxes, but not because of what they say. So long as they do not incite imminent violence, society can tolerate hearing even their vile racism — just as it needs to hear what Stansfield Turner thinks is important.

The public can handle spy stories and racist propaganda more capably and calmly than the Government thinks.